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Torture in the Living Room 
M. Angela Buenaventura1 
INTRODUCTION 
The prohibition against torture has become a jus cogens of international 
law.2  In other words, the prohibition is considered binding on all states, 
even in times of emergency,3 and regardless of a state’s signing of a 
convention or actually practicing in accordance with the norm.4  
Domestically, the United States has signed treaties prohibiting torture and 
also has enacted federal statutes that prohibit torture.  Despite these 
prohibitions, the “torture memos”5 and the leaked photos displaying the 
treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison have shown that the current 
administration is indeed responsible for acts of torture.   
As images of cruel and degrading prisoner treatment—some of which 
rises to the level of torture—have emerged, and evidence of the current 
administration’s acceptance of such interrogation techniques has made its 
way into the public arena, fictional portrayals of torture on television 
programs have become more prevalent.  In this article, I will explore the 
effects that fictional portrayals of torture have on the torture debate in 
America.  By focusing on the portrayal of torture and other coercive 
interrogation techniques on the television program 24—a serial drama in 
which torture methods are tools of the trade for an agent with the fictional 
Counter Terrorist Unit of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—I will 
argue that inaccurate fictional portrayals of torture on television mislead the 
American public as to the true nature of torture, thereby obscuring the 
public debate and diminishing the public pressure to hold those guilty of 
torture accountable. 
I will begin in Part I by briefly addressing the current laws and treaties 
that proscribe the use of torture.  Part II outlines the current public debate 
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on torture, while Part III considers how fictional portrayals of torture on 
television affect this national debate.  Drawing on critiques of the “ticking 
time bomb” hypothetical by David Luban and Elaine Scarry, as well as 
Susan Sontag’s theories about how the public responds to images of war 
and atrocity, I will analyze the ways in which fictional portrayals of torture 
on shows like 24 shape the public debate on torture.  Part IV will explore 
specifically how the television drama 24 fits into and influences that debate.  
Next, in Part V, I will discuss why having a substantive, realistic public 
debate on torture is so important.  Finally, in Part VI, I will propose several 
means, including possible remedies and responses, to counteract the 
detrimental effect fictional portrayals of torture have on any productive 
torture debate.   
I. LAW PROHIBITING TORTURE 
As previously stated, the prohibition against torture has become a jus 
cogens of international law.  Moreover, the United States has signed treaties 
that make torture illegal, and under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, “all 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”6  First, the United States 
ratified the Third Geneva Convention, the Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War,7 in July 1955.8  The Third Geneva 
Convention provides that prisoners of war “must at all times be humanely 
treated”9 and that “no physical or mental torture, nor any other form of 
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them 
information of any kind whatever.”10  
The United States also ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention, the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, 
in July 1955.11  Although this treaty has limited applicability because it only 
comes into force during times of war or occupation, it created a new 
category of international offenses, which it labeled grave breaches.12  
According to Article 147, grave breaches include:  
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willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces 
of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the 
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.13 
In 1994 the United States ratified the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT).14 The treaty came into force when the U.S. Congress passed 
implementing legislation in 1998.15  Article 2 of the CAT provides: 
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,     
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any 
territory under its jurisdiction.  
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of 
war or a threat of war, internal political in stability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.  
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be 
invoked as a justification of torture.16 
Thus, torture is prohibited by the CAT under all circumstances. 
Furthermore, some scholars argue that the U.S. Constitution itself 
prohibits torture.17  For example, the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and 
unusual punishment,18 and the Fifth Amendment provides that life, liberty, 
and property shall not be taken without due process of law.19  
Federal statutes and military codes also prohibit torture: 18 U.S.C. § 2340 
imposes U.S. criminal liability on any individual who commits an act of 
torture anywhere in the world,20 and 28 U.S.C. § 1350 establishes civil 
liability for acts of torture.21  Finally, the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
makes cruelty, oppression, or maltreatment of prisoners by U.S. forces a 
crime.22  
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II. THE CURRENT DEBATE ON TORTURE 
A. The Ticking Time Bomb 
Although torture is unquestionably illegal, the debate persists on whether 
or not torture is justified under certain circumstances.  The focal point of the 
debate about torture is the ticking time bomb hypothetical.  Although the 
hypothetical may be worded slightly differently in different contexts, the 
general dilemma is as follows: A bomb threatens countless lives and a 
suspect refuses to disclose information that might prevent or reduce the 
potential damage from an explosion.  Do you torture the suspect in order to 
obtain information that could save countless lives?  David Luban has noted 
that the ticking time bomb hypothetical has become the “alpha and omega 
of our thinking about torture.”23  Luban stated, “Everyone argues the pros 
and cons of torture through the ticking time bomb.  Senator Schumer and 
Professor Dershowitz, the Israeli Supreme Court, and indeed every 
journalist devoting a think-piece to the unpleasant question of torture, 
begins with the ticking time bomb and ends there as well.”24   
B. Dershowitz  
One of the most well-known analyses of the acceptability of torture, 
which focuses on the ticking time bomb scenario, is Alan Dershowitz’s 
book Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the 
Challenge.25  In his book, Dershowitz explores the possibility of striking a 
balance between national security and civil liberties through the use of 
torture warrants.26  A torture warrant is judicial permission to utilize a non-
lethal method of torture (such as “[inserting] a sterilized needle . . . under 
the fingernails [of a suspect] to produce unbearable pain without any threat 
to health or life . . . .”27) to obtain information from the suspect.28  Law 
enforcement officials would be able to obtain a judicial warrant from a court 
that would allow them to torture a suspected terrorist.29   
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Dershowitz argues that torture warrants would minimize the use of 
torture against terrorist suspects for several reasons.30  First, judges would 
only grant warrants when presented with compelling reasons, so the amount 
of physical violence against terrorist suspects would decrease.31  Dershowitz 
states:  
[A]t the most obvious level, a double check is always more 
protective than a single check . . . . Requiring the decision [to 
torture a suspect] to be approved by a judicial officer will result in 
fewer instances of torture even if the judge rarely turns down a 
request.32   
Second, torture warrants would give suspects one more opportunity to 
testify before being subjected to torture.33 
Dershowitz further argues that torture warrants would bring the debate on 
torture out into the open.34  He contends that integrating torture into the 
legal system through the use of judicial warrants is preferable to allowing 
torture to occur “ad hoc, off-the-books, and under-the-radar-screen.”35  
Torture warrants would make officials publicly accountable for their 
actions, and torture could be confronted in a candid way rather than 
ignoring the problem or pretending that only a few bad apples are 
responsible.36  Dershowitz states that “in a democracy it is always 
preferable to decide controversial issues in advance, rather than in the heat 
of battle.”37 
Moreover, Dershowitz argues that torture warrants would better protect 
the rights of the suspect.  He states that a suspect “would be granted 
immunity, told that he was now compelled to testify, threatened with 
imprisonment if he refused to do so, and given the option of providing the 
requested information.”38  If the suspect refused to provide information, he 
would be threatened with torture.  Thus, the suspect would be more willing 
to provide the information since the use of torture had been authorized by 
law.39 
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C. Criticisms of the Ticking Time Bomb and Refutations of Dershowitz 
Although the ticking time bomb and, by extension, Dershowitz’s torture 
warrants have become the “alpha and omega” of the torture debate, several 
notable scholars—including David Luban, Elaine Scarry, and Richard 
Posner—have denied the practicality of focusing on the ticking time bomb 
hypothetical and have refuted Dershowitz’s rationale for torture warrants. 
1. Luban 
David Luban argues that the ticking time bomb hypothetical has become 
the “alpha and omega of our thinking about torture,” not because the 
scenario is likely to play out in real life, but in order to sway those who 
believe in an absolute prohibition on torture.40  In other words, once this 
extreme and improbable hypothetical convinces a torture prohibitionist that 
her moral principles can be breached under certain circumstances and she 
can no longer claim moral high ground, all that is left is deciding which 
scenarios justify torture.41  In addition, the ticking time bomb serves a 
second rhetorical goal of painting the torturer in a different light—the 
torturer becomes a heroic public servant out to save lives rather than a cruel 
sadist.42  In this way, torture is divorced from cruelty and becomes more 
palatable.43 
Luban warns that in a world of imperfect information, the ticking time 
bomb “bewitches us” and distracts us from the real debate.44  He notes, 
“The ticking-bomb scenario cheats its way around difficulties by stipulating 
that the bomb is there, ticking away, and that officials know it and know 
they have the man who planted it.  Those conditions will seldom be met.” 45  
In reality, al Qaeda suspects will almost never be interrogated to find out 
where a bomb is hidden, but rather to add to a body of intelligence that 
might later “unwind” a terrorist organization.46  Rather than evaluate the 
merits of torture through the black and white lens of the ticking time bomb 
scenario, Luban suggests we ask ourselves more complex and realistic 
questions.  For example, how does the chance that a suspect has vital 
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information affect a decision to torture?47  Does a suspect’s refusal to talk 
after being tortured mean it is time to stop or time to ramp up the level of 
torture?48  Finally, “must a citizen . . . unblinkingly think the unthinkable 
and accept that the morality of torture should be decided purely by totaling 
up costs and benefits[?]”49  At a time when the United States is undertaking 
an endless war on terror and the administration would have us believe that a 
permanent emergency exists, it is dangerous to assume that torture can be 
neatly confined to exceptional ticking time bomb cases.50 
In addition to deconstructing the absurdity of a situation where a would-
be torturer has perfect information and perfect certainty, Luban makes the 
salient point that any discussion of the ticking time bomb hypothetical 
focuses only on discrete instances of torture for emergency’s sake, 
distracting from any discussion of the possibility that we are condoning 
organized torture and a culture of torture.51  He notes, “The real world is a 
world of policies, guidelines, and directives.  It is a world of practices, not 
of ad hoc emergency measures.”52  He further notes that one can reasonably 
infer that the administration’s recent efforts to defend its actions 
demonstrate that a torture culture is firmly in place despite official 
condemnation of it.53  
Moreover, Luban finds fault in Dershowitz’s assertion that warrants 
would make the torture of suspects less likely.54  Noting that Jay S. 
Bybee—who, in August 2002, signed the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
memo interpreting U.S. laws so as to permit torture (“the Bybee 
memo”)55—is now a federal judge,56 Luban asserts that because politicians 
pick judges, if politicians accept torture, then judges will similarly accept 
torture.57  Thus, “once we create a torture culture, only the naïve would 
suppose that judges will provide a safeguard.  Judges do not fight their 
culture—they reflect it.”58 
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2. Scarry 
In her essay “Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz,” Elaine 
Scarry outlines similar contentions with Dershowitz’s reasoning in 
particular and the ticking time bomb hypothetical in general.  Like Luban, 
Scarry explains the improbability of having perfect information about a 
suspect’s guilt and a bomb’s reality.59  She, too, argues that introducing a 
hypothetical occasion for torture that bears no resemblance to “the 
thousands of cases that actually occur” merely serves to “change torture into 
a sanctionable act.”60 
Scarry also echoes Luban’s doubt that torture warrants would decrease 
the incidence of torture,61 noting that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA)62 has declined only one requested warrant in twenty-five 
years.63  Moreover, she argues that there is no reason to believe that people 
who are willing to breach our current prohibition on torture would obey 
court orders if a torture warrant were denied.64  Scarry additionally argues 
that, contrary to Dershowitz’s assertion, torture warrants would not make 
officials publicly accountable for their actions since obtaining a warrant 
would actually release a torturer from liability.65  Finally, Scarry points out 
that warrants most likely would not allow us to review torturers’ actions, 
noting that our “[l]ong experience with search warrants suggests [that] . . . 
far from facilitating review, [they have] historically . . . tended to close the 
door on review.”66   
3. Posner 
Although Judge Posner has expressed approval of Dershowitz’s 
reasoning that civil liberties may need to be curtailed in times of 
endangered public safety, he has expressed strong disapproval of 
Dershowitz’s torture warrant proposal. 67  First, Posner doubts that torture 
warrants would provide a check on executive discretion.68  He notes that 
judicial officers authorized to issue warrants would be selected at least 
partially for their sensitivity to security concerns. 69  In addition, because 
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warrants are issued in ex parte proceedings, law enforcement officers can 
forum shop for judges or magistrates who are likely to approve the 
warrants.70 
Second, Posner refutes Dershowitz’s claim that warrants would 
demystify torture practice and encourage public debate because warrants 
and the reasons for granting them would most likely be kept secret.71  
Posner disagrees with Dershowitz’s proposal that screening would make 
law enforcement officials seeking warrants more candid and would provide 
a significant check against government use of torture, arguing that “[t]he 
requirement of a warrant would no doubt make the [law enforcement] 
officers seeking them a little more careful, but perhaps not much more 
truthful or candid.”72   
Moreover, Posner has expressed strong concerns about legitimizing the 
practice of torture through torture warrants.73  Instead, Posner believes that 
interrogation techniques that may qualify as torture should remain illegal 
technically, but should be permitted in “extreme circumstances.”74  He 
argues that if courts declare that certain highly coercive interrogation 
techniques are acceptable in certain circumstances, officers will explore the 
outer bounds of the rule.75  In addition, Posner argues that subjecting 
something immoral and customarily prohibited to the controls of the legal 
process will legitimize it.76  Posner believes that it would be better “to leave 
in place the customary legal prohibitions, but with the understanding that of 
course they will not be enforced in extreme circumstances.”77  Furthermore, 
Posner notes that “requiring a warrant in cases of coercive interrogation 
would operate merely to whitewash questionable practices by persuading 
the naive that there was firm judicial control over such interrogations.”78 
In summary, the current debate on torture can be characterized generally 
as follows: Those who believe torture should be allowed under certain 
circumstances tend to focus on a cost-benefit analysis and the ticking time 
bomb situation, reasoning that the cost of curtailing civil liberties in times 
of imminent danger is outweighed by the benefit of saving innocent 
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civilians through the use of torture.  Those who would prohibit torture 
believe that the ticking time bomb hypothetical is an unrealistic and 
impractical method of assessing the issue, that the ticking time bomb 
hypothetical obscures real issues, and that torture warrants will not reduce 
the incidents of torture. 
III. HOW FICTIONAL PORTRAYALS OF TORTURE CAN AFFECT THE 
NATIONAL DEBATE 
In order to understand how fictional portrayals of torture can affect the 
public’s understanding of the reality of torture, it is first necessary to 
examine how images of actual torture can influence citizen action.  An 
analysis by cultural commentator Susan Sontag and the public reaction to 
the photographs of abuse at the Abu Ghraib detention center show that 
images play a substantial role in shaping public debate. 
A. Sontag 
In her book Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag explores how 
images of atrocity have the power to shape viewers’ understanding of the 
atrocities in a way that can incite them to act.79  She notes that the 
photographs of the suffering of Vietnamese villagers and American 
conscripts published by Life magazine starting in 1962 intensified protest 
against the American presence in Vietnam.80  Sontag further notes that 
although “[i]t takes some very peculiar circumstances for the war to become 
genuinely unpopular. . . . When it does, the material gathered by 
photographers, which they may think of as unmasking the conflict, is of 
great use.”81  
However, Sontag also acknowledges the limitations and dangers of 
communicating to the public through pictures.82  She stresses that pictures 
serve to mobilize people to act on their own preexisting beliefs rather than 
giving them pause to question them.83  She notes that it is “the whims and 
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loyalties of the diverse communities” that determine the meaning of 
photographs, not the photographer’s intentions.”84  Sontag writes: 
Images of dead civilians and smashed houses may serve to quicken 
the hatred of the foe, as did the hourly re-runs by Al Jazeera, the 
Arab satellite television network based in Qatar . . . . Incendiary as 
that footage was to the many who watch Al Jazeera throughout the 
world, it did not tell them anything about the Israeli army they 
were not already primed to believe.  In contrast, images offering 
evidence that contradicts cherished pieties are invariably dismissed 
as having been staged for the camera.85 
Sontag also notes that pictures can be dangerous because they lead to 
oversimplified conceptions of reality.  Although “[t]he understanding of 
war among people who have not experienced war is now chiefly a product 
of the impact of . . . images,”86 this understanding is dangerous because 
photographs are easily recalled overgeneralizations, “like a quotation, or a 
maxim or proverb.”87   
Furthermore, Sontag points out that photographs of atrocities are 
unreliable because military authorities often censor war photography in 
order to maintain public support and morale.88  She notes:  
What the American military promoted during the Gulf War in 1991 
were images of the techno war . . . that illustrated America’s 
absolute military superiority over its enemy.  American television 
viewers weren’t allowed to see footage acquired by NBC . . . of 
what that superiority could wreak: the fate of thousands of Iraqi 
conscripts who . . . were carpet bombed with explosives, napalm, 
radioactive DU rounds, and cluster bombs . . . .89   
Sontag is not alone in her fear that pictures are manipulated to advance an 
agenda.  Citing the combination of accreditation and daily briefings in 
Vietnam, the selected press pools and video briefings in the Persian Gulf 
War of 1990–91, and the Pentagon’s strategy of embedding reporters and 
their camera crews with fighting units in the most recent war in Iraq, one 
commentator has noted that during the post–World War II period, neither 
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the U.S. nor the U.K. military has operated without detailed media 
management procedures designed to influence pictorial outcomes.90  More 
recently, both the U.S. media and Al Jazeera have used images to 
manipulate public opinion about the war in Iraq.91  While Al Jazeera airs 
footage of “‘blown-out brains, the blood-splattered pavements, [and] 
screaming infants,”92 the U.S. media closes its eyes to civilian casualties 
and airs interviews of the families of American military serving in Iraq.93   
In summary, visual representations of torture can influence the national 
debate because they can incite political action (given the proper context), 
can become easily recalled overgeneralizations of a controversial situation, 
and can be manipulated by the government to create a desired perception of 
events. 
B. Abu Ghraib Photos, 2004 and 2006 
The public’s reaction to the Abu Ghraib photos also supports the notion 
that pictures can lead to political action.  Although written accounts of 
prisoner mistreatment existed before these pictures became public,94 there 
was no substantial public outcry until the pictures of American soldiers 
tormenting Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib were published on April 28, 2004.  
After the pictures were leaked, the Bush administration and its lawyers 
worked to prevent the release of any more photographs or videotapes.95  
Thus, the outrage resulting from the pictures led to political action, albeit 
action to conceal mistreatment.  As mentioned previously and discussed in 
detail in Part V below, the DOJ’s repudiation of its earlier analysis of the 
definition of torture and a legislative amendment prohibiting torture can be 
accredited to widespread public criticism after the Abu Ghraib scandal.96 
Indeed, in 2006, when Judge Alvin Hellerstein ordered the release of 
additional Abu Ghraib photographs after the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit against 
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in October 2003, 97 his opinion 
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reflected a strong belief in the power of pictures to inform the public and 
incite political action.   
Publication of the photographs is central to the purposes of FOIA for two 
main reasons.  First, it initiates debate about the improper and unlawful 
conduct of American soldiers—“rogue” soldiers, as they have been 
characterized.  Second, it raises other important questions such as whether 
supervisory failures in the chain of command may make commanding 
officers culpable in addition to the soldiers who were already court-
martialed for perpetrating the wrongs.98  
Although the government planned to appeal the decision, it abandoned 
the appeal and agreed to release the disputed pictures.99  In a filing to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, government lawyers 
cited Salon.com’s publication of an official army criminal archive that 
included many, if not all, of the disputed images as the reason for dropping 
their legal fight.100  In Salon.com’s February 16, 2006, statement explaining 
why they released the photos, the editors echoed both Sontag’s and Judge 
Hellerstein’s belief in the power of pictures to inform the public and incite 
political action, stating: “The . . . reason for publishing these pictures is that 
the system itself broke down over Abu Ghraib. . . . After an initial flurry of 
outrage, the Republican-controlled Congress lost interest in investigating 
whether senior military officers—and even Pentagon officials—created a 
climate in which torture (yes, torture) flourished.”101 
Government actions to control the messages sent to the public by pictures 
of conflicts, as well as the commentary provided by organizations such as 
the ACLU and Salon.com explaining their efforts to release pictures of 
torture and atrocity, corroborate Sontag’s theory that pictures have the 
power to shape the public’s perception and incite political action. 
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IV. 24: A CASE STUDY ON THE NATIONAL DEBATE AND FICTIONAL 
PORTRAYALS OF TORTURE 
As detailed above, real-life images of torture have the power to shape 
national debate and political action.  That power is not diminished when the 
images are fictional.  In this section, I will explore how fictional portrayals 
of torture can shape the torture debate and incite political action by focusing 
on the popular television show 24. 
A. An Overview of 24 
24, a U.S. television series broadcast by the Fox Broadcasting Company 
(Fox),102 premiered on November 6, 2001, and continues to be aired in 
forty-five countries worldwide.103  The main character, Jack Bauer, is the 
head of an elite team of CIA agents known as the Counter Terrorist Unit 
(CTU).104  The show also features Jack’s colleagues at the CTU, an 
assortment of terrorists, and important political figures such as senators and 
the President.105 
In this concept drama, each season takes place within one twenty-four-
hour period.106  The sense of urgency created by this framework is 
emphasized by a ticking digital clock that appears on-screen throughout the 
show.107  As one commentator has noted, the main characters of this 
program are not Jack Bauer and President David Palmer; they are the 
minute and the second: “Emblazoned on the screen at irregular intervals is a 
digital clock that marks off the passing seconds, and every time we see it, 
our anxiety ratchets up a notch.”108  Also adding to the sense of excitement 
and urgency are the rapid scene changes between different locations, which 
follow the parallel adventures of different characters tied together by the 
central plot.  
The formula for each season remains, for the most part, static: there is a 
central threat to the United States that Jack Bauer and the CTU must stop 
before countless lives are lost.  Throughout each episode, another dramatic 
layer is added to the show as Jack experiences a series of personal problems 
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that are integrated into the main plot.  For example, in season one, the main 
plot involved Jack Bauer and other CTU agents attempting to stop a group 
of terrorists trying to kill presidential candidate David Palmer.109  In a 
subplot, a mole inside the CTU is exposed.110  Tying the plot to Jack’s 
personal life, the terrorists attempt to assassinate Palmer—with whom Jack 
is friends—and capture Jack’s family.111   
One notable characteristic of the show is the frequent portrayal of torture, 
usually utilized to obtain information from a suspect.  As one commentator 
notes: “On 24, torture is less an unfortunate last resort than an 
epistemology.  Whenever an urgent or sticky question of fact arises, 
someone—bad guy or good guy, terrorist or counterterror agent; it doesn’t 
matter—automatically sparks up the electrodes or starts filling syringes with 
seizure juice.”112  Examples abound.  In season one, when a suspected mole 
named Jamey Farrell will not talk, CTU agents brings her to their 
headquarters and threaten to harm her.113  In the same “day,” Jack Bauer 
rams a kidnapping suspect in the chest with the back end of a knife.  As the 
suspect begins to have a heart attack, Jack holds the suspect’s heart pills in 
his hand, claiming he’ll hand them over after he gets the information he 
wants.114   
Later seasons continue the tradition of showing torture under similarly 
urgent circumstances.  In season two, Jack Bauer shows a suspected 
terrorist a video monitor linked to a live satellite of the suspect’s family in 
captivity.115  As he threatens to kill the suspect’s family if the suspect does 
not talk, Jack fakes a shooting of the suspect’s oldest son on the monitor, 
and the suspect gives Jack the desired information.116  In season three, Nina 
Myers, Jack Bauer’s ex-girlfriend and former CTU agent-turned-mole, is 
interrogated by a CTU torture expert to extract information about a deadly 
biological weapon.117  When she refuses to talk, the interrogator sticks a 
needle into her carotid artery.118   
In the first episode of season four, Jack Bauer breaks into an interrogation 
room, shoots a captured terrorist in the kneecap, and threatens to shoot him 
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again if he does not give up the information Jack needs.119  Later in season 
four, when CTU agents suspect that the secretary of defense’s son knows 
something about his father’s kidnapping, they subject him to sensory 
deprivation.120  In the same season, a CTU analyst is suspected of being a 
mole and is immediately brought into the interrogation room for a tasering 
session.121  Later in the season, after Jack Bauer and other CTU agents 
break into a hotel room to arrest a suspected terrorist’s wife who has been 
shot, one of the agents grinds his thumb into the wife’s gunshot wound and 
tells her that she must give up information about her husband if she wants 
the pain to stop.122  During the first episode of season five, Jack Bauer 
interrogates the critically wounded leader of a team of assassins, promising 
medical attention if he cooperates.123  Later in season five, Audrey Raines, 
an inter-agency liaison for the DOD, is implicated in ongoing terrorist 
attacks. 124  She is soon cleared of wrongdoing, but not before being 
subjected to torture involving Sodium Pentothal.125 
24 has become a water cooler show.  According to Nielsen ratings for the 
week of Tuesday, April 18, 2006, 12.5 million Americans watched 24.126  It 
also has received critical acclaim.127  Kiefer Sutherland, who plays Jack 
Bauer and also executive produces the show, won a Golden Globe for his 
performance,128 and the creators of the show, Joel Surnow and Robert 
Cochran, won an Emmy Award.129  24 also won the Golden Globe for Best 
Drama Series in 2004.130   
Although the show deals with timely issues such as terrorism and the use 
of torture, individuals involved in the making of 24 perceive the show 
purely as fictional rather than an attempt to portray real-life events or to 
argue for or against the use of torture in real life.  In an interview with 
Charlie Rose, Kiefer Sutherland stated: “Do I personally believe that the 
police or any of these other legal agencies that are working for this 
government should be entitled to interrogate people and do the things that I 
do on the show?  No, I do not.”131  In addition, Bob Cochran, the co-creator 
of 24, noted that even when government characters torture suspects, they do 
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so in theoretically ideal circumstances: “The terrorist really has the code, 
the bomb is really ticking.”132  He added that “[i]n real life, you don’t have 
that certainty.”133  
B. Is 24 Beneficial or Detrimental to the Debate on Torture? 
Given the power of the visual image to shape public debate, it is worth 
examining whether the portrayals of torture on 24 accurately reflect the 
real-life context in which torture occurs.  In this section, I will analyze both 
the positive and negative contributions 24 makes to the debate, concluding 
that the ticking time bomb scenario played out on television works to 
perpetuate the false debate that currently exists, which ultimately does a 
disservice to a substantive dialogue on torture. 
1. Beneficial Effects of 24 on the Torture Debate 
Because torture on 24 is depicted in a clear and disturbing manner, it 
could be seen as a tool for awakening public discourse.  For this reason, 
Amnesty International has stated that the show is “educational.”134  There 
may be something to this endorsement.  After all, one of the ways the Bush 
administration has sought to evade laws prohibiting torture is through 
creative interpretation of the letter of the law.135  In order to consider what 
should fall within the ambit of torture and should thus be prohibited, the 
public must first become familiar with terms such as “waterboarding” 
(simulated drowning) and Sodium Pentothal.  Use of these methods to 
extract information from suspects on 24 may serve to inform the debate on 
whether this conduct constitutes torture. 
For example, the current administration has attempted to narrow the 
definition of torture to exclude acts that should fall within the ambit of 
“torture.”136  In the “torture memos,” which were meant to define torture in 
the context of interrogations conducted outside the United States against 
enemy combatants,137 the administration attempted to narrow the definition 
of torture so drastically that acts such as waterboarding would not qualify as 
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torture.138  As mentioned previously, in the August 2002 Bybee memo, the 
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) tried to restrict the definition of 
torture to those acts resulting in “serious physical injury, such as organ 
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.”139  Similarly, after 
CBS’s 60 Minutes II aired leaked photographs of prisoners in humiliating 
poses taken at Abu Ghraib,140 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld alleged 
that the pictures—which included scenes of U.S. military personnel forcing 
nude Iraqi prisoners to simulate sex acts, a man badly beaten, and a 
corpse141—portrayed abuse, not torture.142 
The current administration has also creatively interpreted international 
treaties to exclude certain persons from the protection of laws prohibiting 
torture.143  The DOJ concluded in the torture memos that the CAT “may be 
unconstitutional if applied to interrogations” conducted by the United States 
in the course of the “war against al Qaeda and its allies,” and that “necessity 
or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might” violate the 
statute.144  Furthermore, the Bush administration has sought to prevent the 
Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
from being applied to individuals detained at Guatanamo by declining to 
designate them as prisoners of war.145   
Television programs such as 24, which portray torture techniques in a 
graphic manner, may be useful in encouraging public discourse and 
meditation about the boundaries of torture.  As Karen J. Greenberg, 
Executive Director of the Center on Law and Security, notes, “[O]nce we 
understand and define what legal coercive interrogation is, we can perhaps 
separate it from torture.”146  A similar sentiment regarding the importance 
of defining the boundaries of torture was evident during Alberto Gonzales’s 
Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearing.  During his hearing, 
Gonzales stated, “[T]he agencies wanted to be sure that they would not do 
anything that would violate our legal obligations.  And so they did the right 
thing: they asked questions.  What is lawful conduct?  Because we don’t 
want to do anything that violates the law.”147  
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When the American public sees what the administration would consider 
“coercive interrogation techniques” on 24, they are encouraged to consider 
whether such physically and psychologically punishing techniques (which 
appear both on the show and in real life interrogations at Guantánamo and 
Abu Ghraib) qualify as torture.  Public meditation on the boundaries of 
torture—as the public outcry after the release of the Abu Ghraib photos 
shows—is crucial in preventing the administration from narrowing the 
definition of torture.  This type of meditation can be encouraged through 
fictional portrayals of torture on programs such as 24.   
2. Detrimental Effects of 24 on the Torture Debate 
Despite the assertion that fictional portrayals of torture on 24 may 
educate the public as to what various torture techniques look like, such 
portrayals ultimately do more harm than good when it comes to informing 
the public and shaping the debate on torture.  The depictions of torture on 
24 are problematic because the images are grounded in the unrealistic 
ticking time bomb scenario.  Without providing viewers with an accurate 
context, any information gained from viewing the fictional portrayal of 
torture is flawed and detrimental to the public debate. 
First, as discussed above, Sontag notes that pictures serve to mobilize 
people to act on their preexisting tendencies and beliefs rather than to give 
them pause to question their beliefs.148  When new Abu Ghraib photos were 
released worldwide in 2006, the vast difference between the response of 
Americans and the response abroad demonstrated that viewers’ community, 
loyalties, and perspectives shaped their reactions to pictures.  These new 
Abu Ghraib photos, which included “those of a man whose throat had 
apparently been slit, a group of men being forced to masturbate in front of 
guards, photographs of bloodied Iraqis who had been shot, and prisoners 
with burns and weeping wounds,”149 showed up on Australian television 
first,150 then on networks across the Middle East,151 then in the U.S. on 
Salon.com.152  As one commentator noted, the photos “[did] not get much 
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attention in the United States, but [are] drawing expressions of disgust and 
outrage abroad,”153 where they have reawakened bitter memories of the Abu 
Ghraib scandal.154   
Therefore, even if people view photographs of an atrocity, they will not 
be mobilized against the atrocity unless preexisting tendencies and beliefs 
predispose them to protest the atrocity.  Thus, viewing realistic portrayals of 
horrific torture techniques on shows such as 24 can do nothing on its own.  
Though a person might learn what waterboarding is, merely viewing a 
portrayal of somebody being subjected to this type of torture may not incite 
action. 
Second, 24 poses the same dangers as the ticking time bomb 
hypothetical.  Namely, both 24 and the ticking time bomb hypothetical 
work to transform the torturer into a heroic public servant and distract the 
public from the real issues.  24 thus works to perpetuate the artificial debate 
on torture that currently exists.  In the ticking time bomb hypothetical, the 
torturer is not someone who enjoys inflicting pain, but rather is a person 
who must do something he despises in order to save millions of people.  
Similarly on 24, the hero of the show, Jack Bauer, is the torturer.  By 
focusing on Jack’s personal life and integrating it into the show’s main 
story lines, 24 humanizes the torturer.  As one 24 fan at the Washington 
Post has noted, “If you’re addicted to Fox’s ‘24,’ you probably cheered on 
Jack Bauer when, in a recent episode, he snapped the fingers of a suspect 
who was, shall we say, reluctant to talk. . . . Torture’s a no-brainer here.  
Jack’s got to save us all from imminent thermonuclear annihilation.”155  
Thus, like the omnipresent ticking time bomb scenario, 24 turns the torturer 
into a hero, divorcing torture from cruelty.   
In reality, as Luban has noted, interrogators who are trained to torture 
become “inured to levels of violence and pain that would make ordinary 
people vomit at the sight.”156  Luban further notes that, historically, 
individuals trained to torture begin to run amok.  He cites both a 1999 Israel 
Supreme Court decision concerning interrogators needlessly torturing two-
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thirds of their Palestinian captives and the fact that during the Argentinian 
Dirty War, torturers were initially hesitant to inflict torture but by the end 
had become hardened young officers who placed bets on who could kidnap 
the prettiest girl to rape and torture.157  Thus, the fictional image of torturer-
as-hero is incompatible with the reality of those who commit torture. 
In addition, 24 ignores the same issues that the current debate on torture 
neglects to incorporate.  As mentioned previously, the ticking time bomb 
scenario distracts the public from debating the important questions such as 
whether the chance that a suspect has vital information affects the decision 
to torture, whether refusal to talk after torture means it is time to stop or 
time to ramp up the level of torture, and whether the morality of torture 
should be decided by totaling up costs and benefits.158  On 24, the majority 
of the instances of tortures are the result of Jack Bauer’s need to extract 
information from a suspect as quickly as possible in order to save millions 
of lives: 
For 24’s producers, in their fourth season of constructing a save-
the-world scenario that must be completed in one day, the use of 
torture is about ‘real-time’ drama, not politics.  “It goes with the 24 
conceit that we need information and don’t have days to break this 
person.  Sometimes we don’t even have hours.”159 
Thus, while scenarios are crafted to fit the format of a television program 
when problems must be solved in twenty-four hours, they greatly distort the 
context in which torture takes place.  As one commentator has noted: “Real 
intelligence gathering is not a made-for-TV melodrama.  It consists of 
acquiring countless bits of information and piecing together a mosaic.  So 
the most urgent question has nothing to do with torture and ticking 
bombs.”160   
24 also cheats its way around complex issues by concealing the 
consequences of torture.  Although the torture techniques used and 
immediate pain caused by torture are realistically portrayed on 24, the 
context in which torture is used and the long-term costs of torture are highly 
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unrealistic.  For example, in one episode, after two CTU employees are 
shown being tortured because the rest of the CTU erroneously believes that 
they are moles, both subsequently return to work and lead normal lives.161   
In reality, torture survivors suffer for the rest of their lives.  As the Center 
for Victims of Torture notes, “Psychological symptoms of torture frequently 
include anxiety, depression, irritability, paranoia, guilt, suspiciousness, 
sexual dysfunction, loss of concentration, confusion, insomnia, nightmares, 
impaired memory, and memory loss.”162  For example, since Diana Ortiz, a 
Catholic missionary from a Kentucky convent who was working with the 
poor in Guatemala, was kidnapped in 1989 and tortured, her life has never 
been the same.163  Although Ortiz was held for only twenty-four hours, she 
suffered a complete loss of memory of everything in her life prior to being 
tortured.164  After her release, Ortiz no longer recognized her own 
parents.165  Years later, Ortiz still has no memory of her childhood, her 
college years, or her pretorture friendships.166  In short, in both the ticking 
time bomb hypothetical and 24, the consequences of torture—the political 
ramifications of violations of norms governing everyday society and the 
shattering of every aspect of a victim’s well-being—are almost entirely 
ignored.  Thus, fictional portrayals of torture on shows such as 24 are 
dangerous because viewers may assume that the context that gives rise to 
torture on 24 and the political and long-term ramifications are as realistic as 
the torture methods portrayed.   
The fact that the consequences of torture are not revealed in fictional 
portrayals such as 24 is also dangerous because engaging in a calculation of 
consequences could greatly affect the public’s perception of the 
acceptability of torture in times of emergency; 24 distorts the debate in such 
a way that this calculation does not occur.  A Newsweek poll on torture 
found that 58 percent of people would support torture to thwart a terrorist 
attack; however, when asked if they would still support the use of torture if 
such use made it more likely that enemies would torture Americans, 57 
percent said no.167   
  Torture in the Living Room 125 
VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007 
In summary, on 24, torture is only carried out in emergency situations, it 
almost always extracts the desired information, torture victims recover 
seamlessly, and the torturer is a hero.  This fictional portrayal of torture 
becomes the “maxim” that viewers will recall when confronted with the 
topic of torture.  Like the ticking time bomb situation, which has 
“bewitched” us and pulled the torture debate off course, 24’s format cheats 
its way around important and complex issues, reinforcing the ticking-time-
bomb-centered public debate on torture, and causing its viewers to carry an 
unrealistic portrait of torture in their minds. 
V. WHY IS THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON TORTURE IMPORTANT? 
Now that I have generally outlined the current debate on torture, the 
question remains: Why is a public debate on torture important?  As I noted 
in Part I, torture is unquestionably illegal.  However, a gap remains between 
American torture laws and practices.  Incontrovertible evidence 
demonstrates that U.S. forces have tortured prisoners at U.S. detention 
centers in Guantánamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq.168  The ACLU 
documented these incidents of torture in a report submitted to the United 
Nations Committee Against Torture.169  In addition, in March 2006, 
Pentagon officials issued a new rule stating that evidence obtained through 
torture cannot be used by the special panels that review the cases of “enemy 
combatants” being held at Guantánamo.170  The need for such a rule, despite 
numerous laws prohibiting torture, illustrates the current gap between the 
United States’ obligations not to torture and its actual policies and practices.  
Thus, the public debate on torture is important because the American public 
has the ability to pressure the government to close, or at least narrow, the 
gap between the acts of U.S. citizens and the laws prohibiting torture. 
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A. Effect Public Debate Can Have on the Interpretation of the Law 
Governing Torture 
Although international treaties prohibiting torture are guided by larger 
political forces, the interpretation of these treaties is subject to public 
opinion.  One illustrative example of the effect public outcry can have on 
the practical application of laws governing torture is the DOJ’s repudiation 
of its earlier analysis of the definition of torture.  As mentioned previously, 
in the August 2002 Bybee memo, the OLC informed the White House that 
the CAT only prohibits the most extreme interrogation techniques and that 
under the anti-torture statute,171 in order for an act to qualify as torture, pain 
endured as a result of the act “must be equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of 
bodily function, or even death.”172  The memo also stated that the statute 
“may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations” conducted by the 
United States in the course of the “war against al Qaeda and its allies,” and 
that “necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that 
might” violate the statute.173  In addition, a March 6, 2003, draft report by 
Pentagon lawyers defined torture in the narrowest of terms: “[E]ven if the 
defendant [U.S. government agent] knows that severe pain will result from 
his actions, if causing the harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite 
specific intent even though the defendant did not act in good faith.”174   
As a result of widespread public outcry, the OLC issued a December 
2004 memo repudiating its earlier analysis of the definition of torture and 
rejecting the absurdly high threshold for torture set forth in the Bybee 
memo.175  As the Washington Post noted, “This second effort by the Bush 
administration to parse the legal meaning of the word ‘torture’ was 
provoked by the damaging political fallout from the disclosure this summer 
of the first memo, drafted in August 2002 and criticized by human rights 
lawyers and experts around the globe.”176   
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B. Effect Public Debate Can Have on Legislation to Prevent Torture 
Public outcry can also lead to the enactment of legislation that proscribes 
torture.  For example, in response to the public’s reaction to the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, the Senate passed the McCain Amendment on October 5, 2005.177  
As the Washington Post noted: 
When the abuses by U.S. servicemen and intelligence officers at 
Abu Ghraib surfaced last year, there was understandable outrage in 
this country and abroad. . . . In response, Sen. John McCain, 
himself a victim of brutal torture by the North Vietnamese, 
introduced an amendment to the 2006 Defense Appropriations Act 
that would, in essence, require all agencies of the U.S. government 
to comply with the Geneva Conventions and international law, 
which prohibit torture.178 
This amendment prohibits the “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment” of any “individual in the custody or under the physical control 
of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical 
location,” and reiterates existing law, requiring that the DOD’s 
interrogations conform to the U.S. Field Army Manual on Intelligence 
Interrogation.179  The McCain Amendment also requires that persons under 
U.S. control be accorded their Constitutional right to be free from “cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”180  
Recognizing the power of public outcry, Amnesty International asks 
visitors to its interactive Web page “Ten Things You Can Do to Stop 
Torture and Indefinite Detention” to urge their representatives “to 
cosponsor and pass H.R. 952, the ‘Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act’” 
and to urge their senators “to cosponsor and pass S. 654, the ‘Convention 
Against Torture Implementation Act,’ which address the practice of 
‘extraordinary renditions’ (the U.S. practice of sending individuals to 
countries with a record of torture, such as Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and 
Egypt, for interrogation).”181  
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C. Effect Public Debate Can Have on Confirmation Hearings 
Confirmation hearings also allow the public to hold high-level officials 
accountable for their actions.  As the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia noted in Washington Legal Foundation v. Department of Justice, 
“[t]hrough the confirmation process, the public, individuals, and interested 
organizations alike have an opportunity to inform the decisionmaking 
process and scrutinize the President’s nominee.”182  Because confirmation 
hearings have become public spectacles, senators’ performance in these 
hearings are subject to popular review.183  Thus, through senators, the public 
can voice its concern about nominees’ stances on torture.   
Recently, high-level officials have indeed been questioned about their 
stance on torture at nomination hearings.  Most notably, because his stance 
on torture was the subject of complaints by Democrats and human rights 
groups,184 Attorney General nominee Alberto R. Gonzales was questioned 
heavily about torture policy during his 2004 Senate Judiciary Committee 
confirmation hearing.185  For example, Senator Leahy read the definition of 
torture from the Bybee memo and then asked Gonzales if he agreed with 
that interpretation of torture back in August 2002.186   
In addition, during Secretary of State nominee Condoleezza Rice’s 
January 2005 Senate confirmation hearing, Democrats questioned Rice 
about whether she considered certain extreme interrogation tactics to be 
torture.187  Supreme Court nominee Samuel Alito was also questioned about 
his stance on torture during his January 2006 confirmation hearing.188  
Senator Graham asked Alito, “Do you believe that any president, because 
we’re at war, could say, the statute on torture gets in the way of my ability 
to defend the United States; therefore I don’t have to comply with it?”189  
Thus, although high-level officials may not veer from prepared statements 
at public confirmation hearings, the public has some opportunity to hold 
them accountable for their stances on torture. 
  Torture in the Living Room 129 
VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007 
D. Effect Public Debate Can Have on the Prosecution of Torturers 
Public outcry could also lead to the prosecution of torturers, although this 
route to preventing torture may be more difficult and indirect.  There are 
three separate routes to prosecute a torturer: (1) federal criminal 
prosecution, (2) military prosecution, and (3) prosecution by the 
international community.  Federal criminal prosecution of a torturer could 
be pursued under the War Crimes Act of 1996 (as amended in 1997),190 
which authorizes federal prosecution of any U.S. national or member of the 
U.S. armed forces who commits a war crime or of any third country 
national who commits a war crime against a U.S. national or service 
member.191  Federal criminal prosecution of officials could also be pursued 
under the anti-torture provisions of the implementing legislation for the 
CAT,192 which authorizes federal criminal prosecution of U.S. citizens who 
commit torture abroad and of any perpetrator, regardless of nationality, who 
is present in the United States.193  
Military prosecution could be pursued under the U.S. Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, which subjects any person found guilty of cruelty, 
maltreatment, or maiming to punishment “as a court-martial may direct.”194  
Finally, a torturer could be prosecuted by the international community.  
The CAT obligates the international community to investigate and 
prosecute cases of torture regardless of the victim’s nationality or where the 
abuse occurred.195  Indeed, the international community has not only the 
right, but the duty, to prosecute individuals guilty of torture: if the U.S. fails 
to investigate and prosecute incidents of torture and other mistreatment, 
then other countries must do so under the CAT and under the Third Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (which includes 
an obligation to investigate and prosecute grave breaches).196   
Despite these laws requiring the prosecution of individuals who have 
committed torture, those responsible for torture—particularly high level 
officials—frequently escape prosecution.197  A 2005 New Yorker article 
described how in 2003, an Abu Ghraib prisoner named Manadel al-Jamadi 
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died from asphyxiation during an interrogation.198  During the interrogation, 
Manadel’s head was covered with a plastic bag and he was shackled in a 
crucifixion-like pose that inhibited his ability to breathe.199  In a subsequent 
internal investigation, U.S. government authorities classified Manadel’s 
death as a “homicide.”200  Tragically, Mark Swanner, the C.I.A. officer who 
conducted the interrogations, has not been charged with a crime and 
continues to work for the agency.201  Moreover, the Times (London) noted 
that after the initial Abu Ghraib photos surfaced in 2004, only “[n]ine 
American soldiers—all low-ranking Reservists—[were] convicted in 
connection with the abuse . . . .”202 
Public outcry could affect the likelihood of federal criminal prosecutions 
of torture; it has swayed prosecutorial decisions in the past.  In 1991, after 
television viewers nationwide witnessed several white Los Angeles police 
officers brutally attack Rodney King, an African American man whom they 
had pulled over for speeding, public outcry across the country prompted the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to launch a nationwide review of all police 
brutality complaints in the past six years.203  Similarly, in the 1990s, public 
opinion demanding increased environmental protection resulted in a 
prosecutorial climate so charged that, as commentators noted, prosecutors 
became highly incentivized to pursue environmental cases.204  Indeed, 
Alberto Gonzales’s January 25, 2002, memo to the OLC expressed fear that 
future prosecutors and independent counsels would prosecute ex-Bush 
administration officials for violations of the War Crimes Act.205  He urged 
President Bush to exempt the treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters 
from the provisions of the Geneva Conventions,206 arguing that this 
exemption would “create a reasonable basis in law that [the War Crimes 
Act] does not apply, which would provide a solid defense to any future 
prosecution.”207  Thus, public outcry against torture could lead to the 
election of a new president whose administration would prosecute ex-Bush 
officials. 
Moreover, as Professor William Aceves stated:  
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It took over twenty years before the efforts to prosecute Augusto 
Pinochet were successful . . . . And, the impetus for prosecution 
did not come from Chile; it came from the international 
community.  Similarly, establishing responsibility for the abuses 
perpetrated at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo may not happen this 
year (or even this decade).  And it may not happen in the United 
States.  But if history serves as a guide, it will happen.208 
Thus, as citizens of the international community, the U.S. public can bring 
about the prosecution of torturers by supporting international prosecution 
efforts. 
VI. HOW CAN WE COUNTERACT THE TICKING TIME BOMB IN 
TELEVISIONLAND? 
Shows like 24 that portray torture under fictional circumstances can 
perpetuate the already detrimental debate on torture by distorting the costs 
and benefits of torture and making torture appear heroic and necessary.  In 
this section, I will briefly explore what organizations opposed to torture, 
such as Amnesty International, can do to counteract the negative effects of 
fictional portrayals of torture.   
As Sontag notes, visual portrayals of atrocities become the 
overgeneralized “maxim” that is recalled in the viewer’s mind when the 
subject of torture arises.209  In order to counteract the maxim that 24 plants 
in the viewer’s mind, another, more truthful conceptualization of torture 
must take its place.  Salon.com attempted to educate the American public 
about the well-documented abuses that remain unprosecuted by releasing a 
multitude of new photos of Abu Ghraib in 2006.  These photographs failed 
to arouse public reaction for two possible reasons.  First, the public had seen 
similar pictures in 2004, thus their capacity to respond to the images may 
have been dulled.  In Regarding the Pain of Others, Sontag notes that the 
overabundance of images of atrocity has created a “culture of 
spectatorship.”210  “For photographs to accuse, and possibly to alter 
conduct, they must shock”;211 however, “shock can become familiar. Shock 
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can wear off. . . . As one can become habituated to horror in real life, one 
can become habituated to the horror of certain images.”212  Thus, it is quite 
possible that the American public failed to respond to the new 2006 pictures 
because they were no longer shocked that such abuse occurred at Abu 
Ghraib.  This lack of shock can potentially be attributed to the fact that 
similar pictures had previously been released, coupled with the numbing 
effect of watching countless instances of torture in TV dramas.213   
Second, as discussed previously, pictures alone cannot mobilize viewers.  
As Sontag noted, “[P]hotographs supply no evidence . . . for renouncing 
war . . . . The destructiveness of war . . . is not in itself an argument against 
waging war unless one thinks . . . that violence is always unjustifiable 
 . . . .”214  Pictures can fail to send a political message that challenges a 
viewer’s current beliefs if the viewer does not know the context.  Therefore, 
the method of communication used to counteract the false and distorted 
depictions of torture on shows like 24 must be, to some extent, shocking 
and must communicate the appropriate context in which torture occurs.  
Thus, I propose four possible ways of conveying such a message: (1) 
televised disclaimers, (2) disclaimers on fan sites, (3) fictional or 
documentary films, and (4) testimony by survivors.  
A. Televised Disclaimers 
One method of counteracting the negative effects of fictional portrayals 
of torture on 24 would be to air a disclaimer after particularly torture-heavy 
episodes.  Although the Second Circuit has stated, “We are doubtful that a 
few words could erase the indelible impression that is made by a television 
broadcast, . . .”215 as one commentator noted, “All this [statement by the 
Second Circuit] means is that it depends on the effectiveness of the 
disclaimer; a large-text title card preceding the film would undoubtedly be 
more effective than a small-text disclaimer buried in the closing credit 
crawl.”216   
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In the trademarks realm, courts and commentators have noted that 
disclaimers are an effective means of communicating with television and 
film viewers.217  One U.S. district court has stated: “To the extent that the 
viewers of [the film] may have mistakenly believed that [plaintiff] was 
associated with [it], the disclaimer, if it had been appropriately placed with 
the credits, is an adequate means of alleviating the viewers’ confusion.”218  
In examining how a director of a film that was originally produced in black 
and white can “negat[e] the inference that the director of the original film is 
in any way connected with the colorized version,” one commentator noted 
that “[a]ny danger [of consumer confusion] confronting a colorizer could 
easily be averted by an effective disclaimer.”219  Thus, a disclaimer to 24 
could be an effective method of communicating the fictional nature of the 
program, provided that the placement and content of the disclaimer were 
carefully structured.   
With respect to the placement of the disclaimer, in order to ensure that 
viewers of 24 watch the disclaimer, it should be aired between the end of 
the show and the trailer for the next episode.  With respect to the content of 
the disclaimer, one experiment conducted by a law professor suggests that 
disclaimers displayed but not spoken have little effect in preventing 
consumers from drawing misleading impressions.220  Thus, a spoken 
disclaimer by Kiefer Sutherland, the executive producer and hero of 24, or 
another actor familiar to the audience, would be the most effective means of 
conveying the disclaimer.  This spoken disclaimer would highlight the 
differences between the portrayal of torture on television and torture in real 
life.  The disclaimer could also state Sutherland’s personal opinion that 
torture by the government is unacceptable in real life.221 
The disclaimer should also be crafted in narrative format.  As Sontag has 
stated, “a narrative seems more likely to be more effective than image.”222  
Rather than merely stating, “The consequences of torture are much more 
dire than this show would suggest,” Sutherland or another cast member 
could briefly recount the story of a torture victim, outlining where the 
134 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
victim lived, how old the victim was, and what the victim’s life was like 
once they escaped their captors. 
Convincing Fox and the producers of 24 to include a disclaimer may be a 
difficult task given that Fox is part of conservative Rupert Murdoch’s media 
empire.  Disclaimers would also reduce profitable advertising time.  
However, as mentioned in Part V(A) supra, Kiefer Sutherland, the 
executive producer and star of 24, does not personally believe in the use of 
torture by the government and has stated this opinion on national 
broadcasts.223  Thus, convincing 24’s producers to air such a disclaimer may 
be possible.   
B. Disclaimers on Fan Sites 
Another method of communicating disclaimers, which would be cheaper 
than buying advertising time during 24 and easier than convincing the 
conservative Fox network to air an anti-torture message, would be to 
include anti-torture messages on 24 fan Web sites.  24 fan Web sites offer 
fan Weblogs, screen captures, image galleries, and episode transcripts for 
24.  In addition, some fan Web sites host “viewing parties,” which allow 
viewers to chat online while viewing the show.224  As Jeff Alexander, the 
creator of the fan Web site televisionwithoutpity.com notes, 24 is similar to 
The X-Files in that its conspiracy-driven plotlines lend themselves to 
“fevered speculation and discussion by fans.”225  Alexander also notes that 
fan Web sites are popular because people like to try to poke holes in the 
plot. 226    
Fan Web sites receive tens and even hundreds of thousands of visitors.  
As of October 8, 2007, 24addict.com’s site meter indicated that the site had 
a total of 280,083 visitors since its inception,227 and 24weblog.com’s meter 
indicated that it had 1,001,751 visitors since its inception.228  Unofficial fan 
Web sites for 24 are even more popular than Fox’s official 24 Web site.229  
Thus, organizations that wish to convey messages about the realities of 
torture and its use by the current administration could either approach 
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already existing 24 fan Web sites about displaying disclaimers or create 
their own fan Web sites.  These Web sites could be based on the traditional 
24 fan site services, providing episode guides and chat forums in order to 
draw 24 fans.  The disclaimers on these Web sites could include narratives 
written by victims of torture that detail their experiences with the torture 
methods depicted on episodes of 24 and the effects of such torture.  Fans 
interested in poking holes in 24’s plots and noting inconsistencies might be 
particularly interested in the vast differences between the post-torture lives 
of real-life victims of torture and the fictional torture victims on 24.  These 
fans might also be interested in victims’ statements about the fact that 
torturers are likely to obtain false information from desperate captives. 
C. Fictional or Documentary Films 
Organizations that oppose torture could also create fictional or 
documentary films that portray torture in a realistic manner, highlighting 
important issues such as whether the chances that a suspect has vital 
information should affect a decision to torture.  Sontag states that  
 [n]o photograph or portfolio of photographs can unfold, go 
further, and further still, as do The Ascent (1977), . . . the most 
affecting film about the sadness of war I know, and an astounding 
Japanese documentary, . . . The Emperor’s Naked Army Marches 
On (1987), the portrait of a “deranged” veteran of the Pacific war, 
whose life’s work is denouncing Japanese war crimes from a sound 
truck he drives through the streets of Tokyo . . . .230 
In addition, the ability of well-crafted and provocative documentaries to, 
at the very least, draw an audience was demonstrated by the popularity of 
Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11.231  Thus, films could provide viewers 
with a much more detailed understanding of torture practice than pictures or 
disclaimers alone could, and moving to a new medium would capture 
viewers’ attention.  Through these documentaries, viewers would become 
aware of the brutal consequences of torture and the fact that the ticking time 
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bomb scenario bears little resemblance to real-world situations in which 
torture is used. 
D. Testimony by Survivors  
Finally, another way to counter the deceptive portrayal of torture on 
shows like 24 would be to encourage victims of torture to give public 
testimony at churches, college campuses, and on television and radio talk 
shows.  Although at least 500,000 survivors of torture have taken refuge in 
the United States,232 as the Washington Post has noted, “[f]ew Americans 
will ever meet a survivor of torture, and many may find it almost impossible 
to believe what they read about abuses committed by U.S. troops.”233  
Through public appearances by survivors of torture, the American public, 
which has become numbed to photographs of Abu Ghraib, will witness 
torture in a distinctly different format.  Rather than being blurry figures in a 
photograph, victims will become mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters in 
the eyes of the American public.  Instead of conceptualizing torture as 
something that happens to villains with knowledge of a ticking time bomb’s 
whereabouts, the American public will learn that torture happens to 
individuals such as the shy Afghan taxi driver who was choked in a hood 
and forced to kiss his American captors’ boots, or the dignified police 
officer whose American captors photographed him naked and twisted his 
body like a pretzel.234 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Despite a multitude of laws prohibiting torture, documentary evidence 
proves that torture occurs at the hands of Americans.  The Bush 
administration has failed to adhere to laws prohibiting torture and laws that 
require the prosecution of torturers.  However, as the repudiation of the 
Bybee memo and the McCain Amendment demonstrate, the public has the 
power to force the administration to take actions to narrow the gap between 
torture law and practice. 
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Unfortunately, the current debate on torture has been bewitched by the 
unrealistic and impractical ticking time bomb hypothetical.  Moreover, the 
inadequacies of the current debate are reflected in and reinforced by 
fictional portrayals of torture in shows like 24.  Both the ticking time bomb 
hypothetical and 24 pull the torture debate off course, cheat their way 
around important and complex issues, and cause viewers to carry an 
unrealistic portrait of torture in their minds.  These negative effects are dire 
because public awareness and mobilization are crucial to political change. 
In order to counteract the dire effects of fictionalized portrayals of torture 
on shows like 24, organizations opposed to the use of torture can attempt to 
communicate a more realistic portrait of torture to the American public 
through televised disclaimers, disclaimers on fan sites, fictional or 
documentary films, and public testimony by survivors.  Doing so hopefully 
will foster a more realistic and productive public debate about the 
consequences of torture and create an environment in which those guilty of 
torture are held accountable. 
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